The history of Square is usually told through the people who created its games. Hironobu Sakaguchi became inseparable from Final Fantasy. Nobuo Uematsu supplied the music that helped define the series. Yoshitaka Amano gave its early worlds a distinctive visual identity, while developers such as Hiromichi Tanaka, Akitoshi Kawazu, Koichi Ishii, and Nasir Gebelli helped establish the technical and creative language of the company.
Behind those names stood Masafumi Miyamoto, the entrepreneur who created the business in which they worked.
Miyamoto was not primarily a programmer or game designer. Academic research into Square’s beginnings portrays him instead as an investor and entrepreneur who recognized that computer games represented a growing market even though he had little technical expertise himself. His importance came from creating the organization, recruiting talented people, financing their work, and adopting a development philosophy that treated games as collaborative productions requiring specialized artists, programmers, writers, and designers.
That distinction helps explain why Miyamoto can sometimes disappear from popular accounts of Square. He did not write the story of Final Fantasy, compose its music, or program its battles. Yet firsthand testimony shows that he recruited important talent, influenced the appearance of Square’s games, received production credits on early titles, and remained powerful enough as Square’s largest shareholder that, more than fifteen years after the original Final Fantasy, his opposition briefly threatened the creation of Square Enix itself.
The surviving evidence therefore reveals something more complicated than a silent investor. Masafumi Miyamoto helped create the environment from which one of the most influential companies in video game history emerged.
From Den-Yu-Sha to Video Games
Square’s story did not begin as an independent video game company.
Daiji Fujii’s academic study of the birth of Final Fantasy, based partly on interviews with early Square personnel, traces the company’s origin to Den-Yu-Sha, a business operated by Miyamoto’s father, Kuniichi Miyamoto. Den-Yu-Sha worked in electrical power-line construction and had a relatively stable underlying business. Masafumi Miyamoto, however, had already begun imagining a career outside the family enterprise while attending Waseda University.
With financial backing obtained through his father, Miyamoto began a personal computer game development operation in Yokohama in October 1983. It existed initially as a division of Den-Yu-Sha rather than as the independent corporation later remembered as Square. Fujii describes this 1983 operation as the practical origin of Square.
This distinction is important because the corporate history can become confusing. Square Enix’s modern history page lists Square Co., Ltd. as founded in September 1986, when the game operation became an independent company. Some later legal filings have also contained earlier incorporation dates derived from corporate predecessor structures. Those dates should not be mistaken for the beginning of the Square game business. The historical evidence instead points to the game operation beginning in 1983 and Square becoming an independent company in 1986. The research material assembled for this article also warns specifically against treating the 1966 legal predecessor date appearing in some filings as the origin of the video game company.
Miyamoto entered the business at an unusually favorable moment. Nintendo released the Family Computer in Japan in 1983, personal computers were becoming increasingly accessible, and an industry once divided among arcades, expensive computers, and simple electronic games was changing rapidly. Small software houses could now enter a market that had not yet settled into the corporate structures that would define it in later decades.
Miyamoto did not understand programming well enough to build the games himself. Fujii records that he approached the industry from the position of an investor, reasoning that although he could not make a video game personally, he could understand the product and the opportunity.
His problem was finding people who could turn that opportunity into games.
The Computer Salon That Found Square’s Talent
Miyamoto’s solution was unconventional.
In Hiyoshi, Yokohama, he opened what Fujii compares to a modern internet cafe, although there was no internet to connect to. The location contained roughly forty to fifty expensive personal computers alongside magazines and manga, with university students paying to use the machines by the hour.
For Miyamoto, the salon served another purpose. It was a recruiting ground.
Computer programming was still a specialized skill, particularly among university students who could not necessarily afford their own machines. By attracting young people already interested in computers, Miyamoto created a place where he could identify potential developers. Among those who entered Square’s orbit through this environment were Hisashi Suzuki, then a Keio University student, and Hironobu Sakaguchi, who was studying engineering at Yokohama National University. Suzuki gravitated toward management, while Sakaguchi increasingly took creative leadership over game development.
The arrangement captures something important about Miyamoto’s early influence. Rather than trying to become the best programmer in the room, he tried to bring capable people into the room.
That approach would become even more important as games grew more complicated.
Building Games With Specialists
Many early computer games could be created almost entirely by one technically gifted programmer. Miyamoto envisioned something different.
Fujii’s research describes a development strategy built around specialization. Miyamoto expected computers to become cheaper and more powerful, with faster processing and a greater ability to display increasingly sophisticated graphics. If Square was arriving later than established companies, he believed it could differentiate itself by anticipating those improvements.
That meant hiring specialists for individual parts of development. Visuals could be created by people with art training. Programming could be handled by experienced programmers. Stories could eventually be written by professional writers or people capable of approaching games from a literary perspective.
Today that structure sounds normal. Modern game development commonly divides responsibility among programmers, artists, writers, composers, designers, producers, and other specialists. In the small Japanese computer game industry of the early 1980s, however, deliberately assembling these disciplines within the same production organization was more unusual.
Square’s early games began testing the approach. Fujii points to The Death Trap, released in 1984, and Will: The Death Trap II, released in 1985, as examples of the company’s efforts to distinguish itself visually. The latter used more elaborate artwork and animation at a time when graphical limitations were still severe, and Fujii reports sales of around 100,000 copies, an impressive result for the personal computer market.
Miyamoto’s development philosophy therefore mattered beyond any single game. He was helping establish the organizational model from which Square’s later strengths in graphics, music, storytelling, and cinematic presentation could grow.
Square Becomes Independent
Square moved into Nintendo’s rapidly expanding Famicom market during the middle of the decade. Not long after the company began releasing Famicom software, the operation was formally established as Square Co., Ltd. Square Enix’s corporate history dates the independent company’s founding to September 1986.
Growth came quickly.
Fujii records three game releases in 1986 and eleven in 1987, with sales expanding to roughly three billion yen. Square moved into expensive offices in Ginza, one of Tokyo’s most prestigious commercial districts, and appeared to be transforming itself into an established software company.
Appearances were deceiving.
The Famicom boom encouraged publishers to release large numbers of games, and Square participated enthusiastically. Hisashi Suzuki later remembered that titles might sell 200,000 or 300,000 copies without making Square a leading publisher because million-selling games were setting the standard at the top of the market. Development teams were divided into smaller units so that more games could be released, but the strategy did not produce the profits the company needed. Expensive Ginza rent made the problem worse.
By 1987, Square was in trouble.
The company moved from Ginza to an older building in Ueno and cut its workforce. Fujii writes that roughly thirty remaining development personnel were concentrated on what amounted to a final major effort. If the game failed, the company was prepared to close.
That game was Final Fantasy.
Square’s Last Gamble
The mythology surrounding the first Final Fantasy has sometimes reduced Square’s crisis to a simple story: the company was about to collapse, so Sakaguchi called its last game his “final fantasy.”
The historical record is more interesting.
Square really was under severe pressure. Fujii’s study describes the company consolidating its remaining development resources and approaching the project with the understanding that failure could mean the end of the business. When Final Fantasy was released for the Famicom on December 18, 1987, Fujii records shipments of approximately 510,000 copies. Suzuki, speaking retrospectively, remembered roughly 400,000 as the figure that gave the company confidence at a time when the Famicom market was beginning to cool.
Yet Akitoshi Kawazu’s later firsthand account complicates the popular explanation for the game’s name. Speaking with Nintendo president Satoru Iwata, Kawazu remembered that the team wanted a title whose abbreviated initials repeated the same letter. “Fantasy” was already desired, leading them to search for another word beginning with F. “Final” ultimately fit.
The company really was facing a potentially final effort, but the title itself was not simply a coded announcement that Square expected to disappear.
Miyamoto remembered the commercial turning point as well. Fujii cites a 1997 Nikkei Business interview in which Miyamoto credited important early coverage in Famicom Tsūshin, later Famitsu, and suggested that without that exposure it was uncertain whether Final Fantasy would have become such a large success.
The gamble succeeded.
Square had found the franchise that would transform it.
Miyamoto and the Creation of Final Fantasy
Miyamoto’s role in Final Fantasy was not limited to approving budgets.
Akitoshi Kawazu’s Nintendo interview provides one of the clearest pieces of firsthand evidence about Miyamoto’s direct involvement in the original game’s development. Kawazu remembered the team deliberately trying to distinguish Final Fantasy from Dragon Quest. At one point, the effort produced visuals Miyamoto considered too subdued. Kawazu recalled the company president criticizing the screen for being too visually dull, which pushed the team to reconsider its color choices.
Nintendo’s accompanying note identifies Masafumi Miyamoto as Square’s first president and says he produced the Final Fantasy series.
It is a small development story, but an important one. Miyamoto was not merely receiving financial reports from a distant office. He looked at what the developers were producing and, at least on occasion, challenged creative decisions.
Another example was considerably more consequential.
The Meeting That Brought Nasir Gebelli to Square
Hiromichi Tanaka’s recollections for Square Enix’s official Final Fantasy portal connect Miyamoto directly with one of the most important programmers in Square’s early history.
Tanaka remembered that Miyamoto attended a gathering associated with the Super Software Team at the Consumer Electronics Show outside Japan. There he met Nasir Gebelli, an Iranian American programmer already famous among Apple II enthusiasts for technically impressive games. Miyamoto and Gebelli reportedly connected quickly, and the meeting eventually brought Gebelli into Square.
For Square’s young developers, this was no ordinary recruit. Sakaguchi, Tanaka, and others were Apple II users and already knew Gebelli’s work.
Gebelli subsequently programmed projects including The 3-D Battles of WorldRunner and Rad Racer. Tanaka recalled that Final Fantasy followed when Square decided to create a more serious game around the abilities of its newly recruited programmer.
The episode demonstrates Miyamoto’s value in a particularly concrete way. He did not need to write Gebelli’s code to change Square’s technical possibilities. He needed to meet him, recognize the opportunity, and bring him into the company.
The same pattern appears repeatedly in Square’s early history. Miyamoto’s contribution often came through assembling people whose abilities exceeded his own technical knowledge.
From President to Owner
As Square expanded, Miyamoto eventually became less visible in day-to-day game development, while other executives and creators assumed greater operational authority. What did not disappear was his ownership.
That distinction becomes critical when examining Square around the turn of the century.
Former Square and Square Enix president Yoichi Wada later provided a revealing firsthand description of his relationship with Miyamoto. When Wada joined Square in 2000, he encountered a company suffering from organizational and financial problems while simultaneously pursuing expensive ventures such as Digital Entertainment Network company DigiCube, the PlayOnline strategy, and Square’s computer-generated film operation. Wada believed the company required far-reaching restructuring.
But Wada initially lacked the authority to carry it out.
He recalled going directly to Miyamoto, whom he described as Square’s founder and largest shareholder, to request greater executive authority. Miyamoto initially told him it was too early to make him the company’s representative. Wada eventually received representative authority and rose through Square’s leadership. He remembered Miyamoto as highly entrepreneurial, decisive, and willing to make significant decisions quickly once persuaded.
Years after Miyamoto had ceased being the public face of Square, the man trying to restructure the company still had to negotiate with him.
Ownership had preserved his influence.
The Owner Alliance
Miyamoto’s continued position also placed him among the founders who had built several of Japan’s major game companies.
In 2001, Miyamoto joined Enix founder Yasuhiro Fukushima and Namco founder Masaya Nakamura in what became known as an “owner alliance.” The founders acquired small stakes in one another’s companies and sought to encourage connections among the next generation of executives.
Miyamoto, Fukushima, and Nakamura even participated in a contemporary Nikkei Business discussion explaining the alliance, one of the comparatively rare published interviews in which Miyamoto himself appeared. The research material for this article identifies the May 14, 2001 discussion as especially valuable firsthand evidence of his thinking during this later period.
The alliance can look prophetic because Square and Enix would merge only two years later. Wada, however, later cautioned against treating it as the origin of Square Enix. He stated that the actual merger developed along a separate path.
Even so, the alliance demonstrated Miyamoto’s unusual position. Almost two decades after starting a tiny game operation within his father’s company, he now stood beside the founders of Enix and Namco as one of the owners who had helped build Japan’s modern game industry.
Square and Enix Plan a Merger
On November 26, 2002, Square and Enix formally announced that they intended to merge on April 1, 2003.
The announcement framed the transaction as a response to rapid changes in technology, communications, markets, and entertainment. Combining the companies behind Final Fantasy and Dragon Quest, the document argued, would strengthen their ability to compete as a global digital content company.
The original agreement established an exchange ratio of one Enix share for 0.81 Square shares.
Buried deeper in the same corporate filing was a number that demonstrated why Miyamoto still mattered.
As of September 30, 2002, Masafumi Miyamoto personally owned 31 percent of Square. Sony Computer Entertainment held 18.6 percent, while S System, another company connected with Miyamoto’s business interests, held 5.8 percent. No individual shareholder came close to Miyamoto’s personal stake.
He was no longer Square’s president.
He did not need to be.
The Founder Who Could Stop the Merger
In January 2003, Miyamoto demonstrated precisely how much power remained in that ownership.
On January 10, Square and Enix issued an extraordinary public statement responding to media reports that Miyamoto opposed the agreed merger ratio. The companies confirmed the matter with him and announced that they had entered discussions concerning how to proceed.
Four days later, the consequences became clear.
Square and Enix officially amended the merger agreement. Instead of receiving 0.81 Enix shares for each Square share, Square shareholders would receive 0.85. The companies explicitly stated that Miyamoto and associated companies had opposed the original ratio and intended to vote against approval at the extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. They regarded that opposition as a fact capable of seriously affecting the merger and reopened discussions.
The episode is perhaps the clearest measure of Miyamoto’s long-term influence.
Nearly twenty years after beginning a PC game division in Yokohama, the founder could still force two of Japan’s most important video game companies back to the negotiating table.
The revised agreement moved forward, shareholders approved the merger, and Square Enix came into existence on April 1, 2003. Square Enix’s official corporate history records the merger as the moment Square Co., Ltd. and Enix Corporation became the new Square Enix.
Miyamoto had not prevented the merger. He had altered its terms.
The Founder After Square
Miyamoto’s relationship with the company did not end in 2003.
Official Square Enix records continued to list him among the company’s largest shareholders for years afterward. A December 2006 corporate notice recorded that he still held nearly 10 percent of the voting rights and ranked as the company’s second-largest shareholder. The same filing stated that his reported purpose for retaining the shares was connected to his status as founder of the former Square and his intention to continue holding them for the stability of Square Enix’s management.
The numbers gradually declined in later years, but his continued ownership illustrates how long his connection to Square lasted. The entrepreneur who had financed a small development operation in 1983 remained financially tied to its corporate successor decades later.
That continuity also explains why simply describing Miyamoto as “the first president of Square” understates his historical significance.
His presidency was only one phase of his influence.
Miyamoto’s Place in Video Game History
Masafumi Miyamoto occupies an unusual place in the history of Japanese video games because his greatest contribution was not a famous character, soundtrack, line of code, or game scenario.
It was Square itself.
He recognized an emerging software business before the Japanese console game industry had fully taken shape. He created a computer salon that doubled as a place to discover young talent. He recruited people such as Hironobu Sakaguchi and Hisashi Suzuki into the developing organization. He promoted specialized development at a time when games were often associated with individual programmers. He helped bring Nasir Gebelli into Square. He intervened in the appearance of the original Final Fantasy. When the company survived its difficult years and became one of the most important publishers in Japan, he remained its dominant owner.
Even after other executives ran the company, Miyamoto remained a figure they could not ignore. Yoichi Wada went directly to him when he needed authority to restructure Square. When Square and Enix announced their merger, Miyamoto’s opposition to the exchange ratio was powerful enough to produce a formal renegotiation within days.
The creators inside Square made the games that players remember. Miyamoto created many of the circumstances that allowed those creators to meet, work together, experiment, fail, and eventually build something extraordinary.
Without him, there might still have been Japanese role-playing games. There would almost certainly still have been an Enix, a Nintendo, and a thriving Japanese game industry.
There would not have been the same Square.
And without Square, the history of video games would look very different.
Sources & Further Reading
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