Some of the most important people in video game history never became famous for writing code, drawing characters, or designing levels. Their influence came from deciding which games reached stores, which foreign companies entered the American market, which licenses became video games, and which developers received the money and distribution needed to put their work in front of players.
Raymond C. “Ray” Musci belongs to that side of video game history.
Across a career stretching from the arcade industry of the 1980s into the increasingly global console business of the 1990s and early 2000s, Musci worked with Data East USA, helped establish Ocean of America, led the American operation of Infogrames Entertainment, and founded BAM! Entertainment. His career repeatedly placed him at points where the structure of the industry was changing.
The surviving corporate record describes Musci less as a traditional game developer than as an executive, publisher, company founder, and strategist. By 2003, BAM! Entertainment’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission identified him as the company’s founder and chief executive officer. Those records also traced his earlier leadership of Ocean of America and the American division of Infogrames.
His story is therefore not simply the history of one company. It is part of the larger story of how the American video game business rebuilt itself after the early 1980s, became increasingly international, embraced entertainment licensing, and eventually developed into a network of publishers, developers, console manufacturers, retailers, and intellectual property owners spread across several continents.
Before Data East: A Complicated Early Record
Musci’s earliest years in the game business present an unusual problem for historians because later biographies do not perfectly match the surviving contemporary evidence.
Modern biographical accounts have sometimes claimed that Musci was already at Data East USA in 1984 and that he established its consumer software division during that period. MobyGames, for example, credits him with helping move Data East’s arcade properties into home computers and consoles and connects him with the company’s early relationship with Nintendo.
Contemporary trade material complicates that chronology.
In November 1984, Cash Box identified Ray Musci with Universal USA, Inc. when it listed industry representatives nominated to assist Underwriters Laboratories with amusement machine safety standards. Universal USA was part of the coin-operated amusement business rather than a home console publisher.
The evidence becomes even clearer in April 1986. An industry directory published by Play Meter listed Universal USA in Fremont, California, and named Ray Musci as its operations manager. The company was described as dealing in laser disc and video games.
That does not mean Musci had no connection to Data East during the broader period, but it does mean that the often repeated claim that he was directing Data East’s consumer business continuously from 1984 should be treated cautiously unless stronger contemporary documentation is discovered.
What can be established much more firmly is that Musci had become a senior Data East executive by the end of the decade.
Data East and the Expanding American Game Market
Data East was one of the Japanese companies that successfully operated on both sides of the arcade and home video game businesses during the 1980s. Its catalog included arcade titles as well as games adapted for increasingly important home platforms.
By April 1989, there is no ambiguity about Musci’s position. Cash Box identified him as executive vice president of Data East’s coin-operated division while covering the company’s arcade game Hippodrome. Musci spoke publicly about the game’s design and commercial potential, placing him directly in the company’s senior management structure.
Later corporate filings independently confirm the relationship. A Talon International proxy statement described Musci as a former Executive Vice President and General Manager of Data East USA, the American subsidiary of Japan’s Data East Corporation.
This was an important moment to work for a Japanese game company in the United States. The American console market had changed dramatically after Nintendo introduced the Nintendo Entertainment System. Data East became one of the publishers associated with the new system and developed a presence that crossed the boundaries between arcades, home computers, and consoles.
Musci also accumulated credits connected to games of the period. MobyGames lists him in the credits of titles including Cobra Command, Rampage, and Heavy Barrel. Those credits should not be confused with evidence that he personally designed or programmed those games, but they illustrate how closely his executive career was connected to the software that Data East was bringing to market.
By 1990, however, Musci was moving into a different position, one that would make him a bridge between the American and European video game industries.
Building Ocean of America
Ocean Software had become one of Britain’s most recognizable game companies during the 1980s. It was particularly successful at turning films and other entertainment properties into computer and console games. Titles connected with films such as RoboCop, Batman, Platoon, and The Untouchables helped make Ocean’s name familiar far beyond Britain.
The United States represented both an enormous opportunity and a difficult market. European publishers could not simply assume that games successful at home would automatically succeed in American retail stores.
Ocean needed a stronger American presence.
In 1990, Musci became one of the people responsible for creating it.
BAM! Entertainment’s later SEC filings state that Musci was a co-founder, president, and chief operating officer of Ocean of America from 1990 until Ocean’s merger with Infogrames Entertainment in May 1996. He also served as a director of Ocean International beginning in 1994.
A contemporary issue of Computer Gaming World helps show what this meant at the time. In an article discussing European publishers entering the United States, the magazine noted that Ocean was expanding more aggressively into the American market and described former Data East executive Ray Musci as a major figure in the effort to bring European-developed action games to American players.
This was more than a geographical expansion. Ocean of America represented a change in how international video game publishing worked.
Instead of treating Europe and the United States as almost separate industries, companies increasingly tried to coordinate development, licensing, marketing, manufacturing, and distribution across borders. Musci had already worked for the American subsidiary of a Japanese company. At Ocean he was now helping the American arm of a British publisher compete inside the same marketplace.
Hollywood, Ocean, and the Licensed Game Business
Musci’s Ocean years also placed him near another transformation in the industry: the increasingly close relationship between video games and Hollywood.
Ocean had already discovered the commercial value of movie licenses. By the beginning of the 1990s, film studios were becoming more aware that successful movies could support entire networks of related products, including toys, books, soundtracks, and video games.
A 1991 Los Angeles Times article on the growing connection between movies and video games interviewed Musci as president of Ocean of America. The newspaper noted Ocean’s work on games connected to films such as Top Gun and Batman and discussed the company’s involvement with The Addams Family. Ocean had begun working with Orion Pictures on the property before the film ultimately moved to Paramount.
That relationship between recognizable entertainment properties and video games would become one of the recurring themes of Musci’s career.
For publishers, licensed games offered something original properties often lacked: immediate recognition. A child who already watched a television series or a moviegoer who had just seen a popular film did not need to be introduced to the characters.
The tradeoff was risk. Publishers had to pay for licenses, satisfy intellectual property owners, coordinate development schedules, and often release games while the underlying film or television property was still commercially relevant.
Musci would eventually build much of BAM! Entertainment around exactly that model.
Ocean Becomes Part of Infogrames
Ocean’s growth also made it attractive to larger companies.
In 1996, French publisher Infogrames Entertainment acquired Ocean International. For Musci, the deal transformed his role rather than ending it.
BAM!’s SEC records state that from May 1996 through July 1999 Musci served as president, chief executive officer, and a director of Infogrames Entertainment’s United States division.
Later SEC biographies credited him with responsibility for approximately 250 employees and substantial expansion of the company’s business during this period. Those later filings state that he had built Ocean of America to approximately $50 million in annual revenue before its sale to Infogrames.
The Infogrames period also placed Musci near another emerging frontier: online games.
In June 1997, Wired reported on a partnership involving Concentric Networks and European game companies entering the American online market. Musci, identified as president of Infogrames, explained that the company intended to offer 22 games online and adapt them for American consumers.
The adaptations involved more than translating French text into English. Interfaces could be changed and difficulty adjusted for the target market. Musci summarized the philosophy simply by arguing that, regardless of origin, a good game remained a good game.
That episode captures much of what his career had become. Musci was not primarily sitting at a workstation creating the games. He was concerned with how games moved between countries, platforms, audiences, and business models.
Leaving Infogrames and Starting Again
Musci left Infogrames in 1999.
Rather than moving away from video games, he started another publisher.
The new company was originally called Bay Area Multimedia, Inc. Corporate records state that it was incorporated in California in October 1999 and began operations that same month. It reincorporated in Delaware in September 2000, changed its name to BAM! Entertainment in December, and had begun shipping products in June 2000.
Musci’s own employment agreement dates from October 1, 1999. The agreement placed him in the role of president and chief operating officer during the company’s formative period.
By 2003, BAM!’s proxy statement formally described Musci as the company’s founder. He had served as president, chief operating officer, chief financial officer, secretary, board member, and eventually chief executive officer at different stages of the young company’s development.
BAM! represented a new company, but Musci was applying lessons that could be traced back through Ocean and Data East.
The company would connect outside developers with recognizable properties and then use an international publishing and retail network to put the finished games in front of consumers.
BAM! Entertainment and the Power of Licensed Characters
BAM!’s SEC filings provide an unusually detailed picture of the company’s strategy.
The publisher produced software for a wide range of hardware, including the PlayStation, PlayStation 2, Nintendo 64, GameCube, Game Boy Color, Game Boy Advance, Xbox, personal computers, and even portable devices from Palm and Handspring.
Much of its business depended on licensing.
BAM! told investors that it obtained properties from film, sports, television, and other entertainment companies and then worked with outside developers to turn those properties into games. Development frequently took between twelve and twenty-four months, although Game Boy Advance projects could be considerably shorter. Finished products then moved through retailers that included Walmart, Target, Kmart, Toys “R” Us, Best Buy, GameStop, and Electronics Boutique.
The strategy produced a catalog filled with familiar names.
Cartoon Network became particularly important. BAM! published games involving The Powerpuff Girls, Dexter’s Laboratory, Samurai Jack, and Ed, Edd n Eddy. In 2003, Musci described the continuing Cartoon Network relationship while the company prepared an Ed, Edd n Eddy title for the Game Boy Advance.
BAM! also pursued properties outside children’s television. Its agreements and releases touched Aardman’s Wallace & Gromit, Carmen Sandiego, Sports Illustrated for Kids, films, and other entertainment brands.
The approach reflected Musci’s Ocean experience. A strong entertainment license provided a publisher with an existing audience, but the publisher still needed the development, manufacturing, marketing, and distribution network required to turn recognition into sales.
Wallace & Gromit, Family Games, and a Crowded Market
One of BAM!’s better-known licensed projects was Wallace & Gromit in Project Zoo.
Developed by Frontier Developments, the game reached PlayStation 2 and Xbox in North America in October 2003, with a GameCube release also planned. Musci used the launch to emphasize BAM!’s commitment to family-oriented titles and the enthusiasm that the Wallace and Gromit property had generated among retailers and consumers.
By this point, however, the economics of publishing licensed games were becoming increasingly difficult for BAM!.
Licenses required advances. Developers required financing. Retailers expected marketing support and could demand price protection or other concessions. Games could miss release windows, licensed properties could lose popularity, and publishers could be left carrying development costs for products that no longer had the sales potential originally expected.
BAM!’s own filings openly acknowledged those dangers.
The company depended heavily on third-party developers, and its profitability could be damaged if a licensed property performed below expectations. The very model that allowed a relatively small publisher to build a recognizable catalog could also expose it to costs that were difficult to absorb when several projects went wrong at once.
Financial Trouble and Restructuring
The warning signs became increasingly visible in 2002.
In April of that year, BAM! sharply reduced its revenue outlook. United Press International reported that the company blamed delayed releases and poor execution in worldwide sales and distribution. Musci acknowledged disappointing performance and pointed to rapidly changing conditions in the handheld game market, including shorter product life cycles and concessions that had to be made to retailers.
The company subsequently began restructuring.
SEC records show that BAM! cut staff in late 2002 and sold the assets and operations of its London development studio to VIS Entertainment in January 2003.
The financial position remained difficult. By the end of 2003 and into 2004, BAM! was reporting recurring losses, declining cash reserves, financing difficulties, and questions about its ability to continue operating. Its filings recorded an accumulated deficit of tens of millions of dollars and warned investors that additional financing would be necessary.
Yet Musci and BAM!’s management were not simply retreating.
They attempted something much more ambitious.
The VIS Entertainment Gamble
In 2004, BAM! moved to acquire VIS Entertainment, the Scottish developer that had purchased BAM!’s London studio only the year before, along with State of Emergency Development Corporation.
The strategy was meant to change the structure of BAM!’s business.
Until then, much of BAM!’s model had depended on outside development teams. Acquiring VIS would give the publisher more development capacity of its own, along with technology, personnel, and intellectual property.
BAM!’s filings explained that the combined organization could develop more of its important properties internally, including licenses such as Carmen Sandiego, Wallace & Gromit, The Powerpuff Girls, and Dexter’s Laboratory. Management hoped that internal development would allow the company to retain a larger share of the economics of its games.
Musci publicly described the VIS acquisition as one of the company’s most significant achievements. He argued that it added development talent, technology, intellectual property, management experience, and relationships that could better position BAM! for both existing hardware and future console generations.
The logic was understandable.
BAM! had spent years operating mainly as a publisher coordinating licenses and external developers. Bringing more development inside the company could potentially reduce its dependence on outside studios and create intellectual property it controlled directly.
The problem was that the company was attempting this transformation from a financially weak position.
The Limits of the Independent Publisher
BAM!’s struggles reveal something important about the video game industry of the early 2000s.
The PlayStation 2, Xbox, GameCube, and Game Boy Advance era could produce enormous sales, but it also demanded increasingly expensive production, marketing, licensing, and distribution. Publishers operating below the level of giants such as Electronic Arts, Activision, Nintendo, and the major Japanese firms could find themselves squeezed between large development costs and an unforgiving retail environment.
BAM!’s 2004 financial statements showed the seriousness of the situation. During the nine months ending March 31, 2004, the company reported an $11.2 million net loss and only $290,000 in cash and cash equivalents. Its accumulated deficit had reached approximately $71 million. The company itself warned that substantial doubt existed about its ability to continue as a going concern.
The record is important because it prevents BAM!’s history from becoming a simple story of licensed games and recognizable cartoon characters.
Behind every release stood contracts, royalties, financing, manufacturing schedules, retailer negotiations, development milestones, and substantial financial risk.
Musci’s career had been built around connecting those different parts of the industry. BAM!’s difficulties demonstrated how fragile those connections could become when costs rose faster than revenue.
Later SEC biographies place the end of Musci’s BAM! tenure in 2005.
A Career Beyond BAM!
Musci did not disappear from technology and entertainment after BAM!.
By 2006 he had become involved with New Motion Mobile, first as a consultant and then as president and chief operating officer. Later corporate records describe his work across mobile entertainment, digital media, and corporate development, extending a career that had begun in the coin-operated amusement industry into a much different era of digital distribution.
That transition is fitting.
When Musci first appears clearly in the surviving contemporary trade record, video games were still strongly associated with coin-operated machines in arcades. During the following two decades he worked through the rise of Nintendo’s home-console market, the expansion of European publishers into the United States, the convergence of Hollywood and video game licensing, the first wave of commercial online gaming, and the increasingly expensive console publishing business of the early 2000s.
His later work in mobile and digital entertainment represented another shift in the same long story.
Executive, Publisher, and Industry Builder
Calling Ray Musci simply a game developer misses what makes his career historically interesting.
He received credits on games and worked closely with companies that developed software, but the documentary record points overwhelmingly toward another role. Musci was an executive who specialized in building companies, entering markets, arranging distribution, licensing entertainment properties, working across national boundaries, and trying to position publishers for technological changes.
His history connects several different eras of the business.
At Universal USA and Data East, he was part of the coin-operated amusement world that helped define video games before home consoles became dominant.
At Ocean of America, he helped a major British publisher establish a stronger presence in the United States at a moment when European companies were pushing aggressively into the American market.
At Infogrames, he managed the American operation of a French company that was becoming increasingly international and was already experimenting with online distribution.
At BAM! Entertainment, he created a publisher built around recognizable entertainment licenses, broad console support, external development relationships, and international retail distribution.
Each chapter reflected the industry around it.
Why Ray Musci Matters to Video Game History
Video game history is often told through hardware and software. A new console appears, a famous developer creates a landmark game, or a franchise becomes a worldwide success.
That approach leaves out much of the machinery that made those successes possible.
Games have always needed companies capable of financing development, securing licenses, negotiating with console manufacturers, arranging manufacturing, convincing retailers to stock products, advertising them to consumers, and moving them across international borders.
Ray Musci spent much of his career inside that machinery.
His path from the American arcade business to Data East, Ocean of America, Infogrames, and BAM! Entertainment traces the evolution of the game industry itself. Japanese, American, British, and French companies increasingly became connected. Arcades gave way to home consoles as the center of the business. Hollywood properties became valuable game licenses. Publishers moved from national markets toward international operations, and online distribution began appearing alongside traditional boxed software.
Not every company Musci led survived those transitions. BAM!’s financial troubles show just how dangerous the publishing business could be. Yet failure is also part of video game history. The companies that disappeared often reveal as much about the economics of the industry as the companies that endured.
Musci’s career therefore deserves attention not because he created one universally recognized game, but because he repeatedly operated where different parts of the industry met.
He connected foreign publishers with American consumers, entertainment licenses with developers, games with retailers, and established businesses with new markets. That work usually happened behind the screen, but without people performing it, many of the games remembered today would never have reached the players who made them part of video game history.
Sources & Further Reading
BAM! Entertainment, Inc. “Definitive Proxy Statement.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, November 26, 2003. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132809/000095014803002810/v93864dedef14a.htm
BAM! Entertainment, Inc. “Preliminary Proxy Statement.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2004. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132809/000095014804000432/v96790pre14a.htm
BAM! Entertainment, Inc. “Quarterly Report, Form 10-Q.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132809/000095014803002390/v93319e10vqza.htm
BAM! Entertainment, Inc. “Quarterly Report, Form 10-Q.” May 24, 2004. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132809/000095014804000954/v99171e10vq.htm
BAM! Entertainment, Inc. “Press Release.” May 24, 2004. Exhibit filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132809/000095012904003731/v99392exv99w1.htm
BAM! Entertainment, Inc. “Preliminary Proxy Statement.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132809/000095014803002534/v93864prpre14a.htm
BAM! Entertainment, Inc., and Raymond C. Musci. “Executive Employment Agreement.” October 1, 1999. FindLaw. https://corporate.findlaw.com/contracts/compensation/executive-employment-agreement-bam-entertainment-inc-and2.html
Warner Bros. Consumer Products and BAM! Entertainment, Inc. “Dexter’s Laboratory License Amendment.” March 2002. Justia Contracts. https://contracts.justia.com/companies/bam-entertainment-inc-70659/contract/1055696/
Warner Bros. Consumer Products and Bay Area Multimedia, Inc. “Yogi Bear Retail License.” Justia Contracts. https://contracts.justia.com/companies/bam-entertainment-inc-70659/contract/1082806/
Aardman Animations Limited and BAM! Entertainment, Inc. “Licence and Option Agreement.” January 14, 2002. Onecle. https://contracts.onecle.com/bam/aardman.lic.2002.01.14.shtml
Sony Computer Entertainment America Inc. and Bay Area Multimedia, Inc. “PlayStation 2 Licensed Publisher Agreement.” FindLaw. https://corporate.findlaw.com/contracts/operations/playstation-2-licensed-publisher-agreement-sony-computer.html
BAM! Entertainment, Inc. “Contracts and Agreements.” FindLaw Corporate Counsel. https://corporate.findlaw.com/contracts/company/b/bam%21-entertainment-inc.html
BAM! Entertainment, Inc. “Contracts and Agreements.” Justia Contracts. https://contracts.justia.com/companies/bam-entertainment-inc-70659/
Spyglass Entertainment and BAM! Entertainment, Inc. “Output Agreement.” May 29, 2003. ClubJuris. https://bizcontracts.clubjuris.com/bam/spyglass.output.2003.05.29.php
New Motion, Inc. “Schedule 14F-1.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2007. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1022899/000114420407004784/v064200_sc14f1.htm
New Motion, Inc. “Form 10-KSB/A.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1022899/000114420408024899/v112008_10ksb-a.htm
Atrinsic, Inc. “Preliminary Proxy Statement.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2011. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1022899/000114420411053345/v234227_pre14a.htm
Atrinsic, Inc. “Current Report, Form 8-K.” September 2011. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1022899/000114420411053346/v235027_8k.htm
Talon International, Inc. “Preliminary Proxy Statement.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2006. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1047881/000114036106008972/formpre14a.htm
Talon International, Inc. “Definitive Proxy Statement.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1047881/000117091808000388/def14a-071408.htm
Talon International, Inc. “Definitive Proxy Statement.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2009. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1047881/000117091809000226/def14a-071309.htm
“Data East’s Hippodrome.” Cash Box, April 29, 1989. https://www.worldradiohistory.com/Archive-All-Music/Cash-Box/80s/1989/CB-1989-04-29.pdf
Cash Box. November 18, 1989. https://www.worldradiohistory.com/Archive-All-Music/Cash-Box/80s/1989/CB-1989-11-18.pdf
Play Meter. December 1, 1984. International Arcade Museum. https://elibrary.arcade-museum.com/Play-Meter/1984-December-01/16
Play Meter. April 1, 1986. International Arcade Museum. https://elibrary.arcade-museum.com/Play-Meter/1986-April-01/44
Computer Gaming World. No. 73, 1990. Computer Gaming World Museum. https://www.cgwmuseum.org/galleries/issues/cgw_73.pdf
“VideoGameland: A Land Between Movieland and Cableland.” Los Angeles Times, November 10, 1991. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-11-10-ca-2029-story.html
Brown, Janelle. “Concentric Imports Continental Gaming.” Wired, June 1997. https://www.wired.com/1997/06/concentric-imports-continental-gaming/
Broadcasting. January 24, 1994. World Radio History. https://www.worldradiohistory.com/Archive-BC/BC-1994/BC-1994-01-24.pdf
United Press International. “Bam Entertainment Issues Outlook Warning.” April 1, 2002. https://www.upi.com/Business_News/2002/04/01/Executive-Business-Briefing/13411017670871/
Nintendo World Report. “Samurai Jack Games Confirmed!” January 10, 2002. https://www.nintendoworldreport.com/news/6868/samurai-jack-games-confirmed
Nintendo World Report. “Bernie Stolar Heads to BAM!” January 22, 2002. https://nintendoworldreport.com/news/6887/bernie-stolar-heads-to-bam
Nintendo World Report. “Ed, Edd n Eddy Coming to the GBA.” April 7, 2003. https://www.nintendoworldreport.com/news/8485/ed-edd-n-eddy-coming-to-the-gba
GameSpot. “Wallace & Gromit Arrive on the PS2 and Xbox.” October 8, 2003. https://www.gamespot.com/articles/wallace-and-gromit-arrive-on-the-ps2-and-xbox/1100-6076522/
WorthPlaying. “BAM! Entertainment Signs Starsky & Hutch.” March 9, 2004. https://worthplaying.com/article/2004/3/9/news/15720-bam-entertainment-signs-starsky-hutch-ngcgba/
MobyGames. “Ray Musci.” Accessed October 27, 2026. https://www.mobygames.com/person/69218/ray-musci/
MobyGames. “Ray Musci: Video Game Credits.” Accessed October 27, 2026. https://www.mobygames.com/person/69218/ray-musci/credits/
MobyGames. “BAM! Entertainment, Inc.” Accessed October 27, 2026. https://www.mobygames.com/company/1984/bam-entertainment-inc/
Game Developer Research Institute. “Ocean of America.” Accessed October 27, 2026. https://gdri.smspower.org/wiki/index.php/Ocean_of_America
“The Making of RoboCop.” Retro Gamer, no. 46. https://electronicsandbooks.com/edt/manual/Magazine/R/Retro%20Gamer%20UK/46.pdf
Morpheus Ventures. “Ray Musci.” Accessed October 27, 2026. https://morpheus.com/team/specialists/ray-musci/
Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre. “How to Measure the Impact of Overseas Mergers and Acquisitions on the UK Video Games Industry: Feasibility Study.” British Film Institute, 2023. https://pec.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/bfi-how-to-measure-impact-of-overseas-mergers-and-acquisitions-on-uk-video-games-industry-feasibility-study-2023-11-08.pdf
Code Like It’s 198x. “Data East.” Accessed October 27, 2026. https://code198x.com/vault/companies/data-east/